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Abstract. Quantum cryptography, quantum computer project,
space-time quantization program and recent computer experiments
reported by Accardi and his collaborators show the importance and
actuality of the discussion of the completeness of quantum mechan-
ics (QM) started by Einstein more than 70 years ago. Many years
ago we pointed out that the violation of Bell’s inequalities is neither
a proof of completeness of QM nor an indication of the violation
of Einsteinian causality. We also indicated how and in what sense
a completeness of QM might be tested with the help of statistical
nonparametric purity tests. In this paper we review and refine our
arguments. We also point out that the statistical predictions of QM
for two-particle correlation experiments do not give any determinis-
tic prediction for a single pair. After beam is separated we obtain
two beams moving in opposite directions. If the coincidence is re-
ported it is only after the beams had interacted with corresponding
measuring devices and two particles had been detected. This fact
has implications for quantum cryptography. Namely a series of the
measurements performed on the beam by Bob and converted into a
string of bits (secret key) will in general differ, due to lack of strict
anti-correlations , from a secret key found by Alice using the same
procedure.
Keywords: Bell’s inequalities, completeness of quantum mechanics, purity
and ergodicity tests, EPR correlations, quantum cryptography
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1.1 1.Introduction
Let us imagine that we are sitting on a shore of an island on a lake watching a
sunset. We see the birds flying , the leaves and branches are moving with a wind,
a passage of a boat produces all interesting patterns on the surface of the water
and finally we hear regular waves hitting the shore. Finally a big round circle of
the sun is hiding under the horizon leaving a place for beautifully illuminated
clouds and later for the planets and stars. All these physical phenomena are
perceived by us in three dimensions and they are changing in time usually in
the irreversible way.
To do the physics we have to construct mathematical models leading to
the predictions concerning our observations and measurements this is why we
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created concepts of material points, waves and fields. For Newton light was a
stream of small particles for Maxwell light was an electromagnetic wave moving
in a continuous invisible medium called ether , similarly to waves on a water.
With abandon of the concept of ether in special theory of relativity the image of
the propagation of light became less intuitive. A discovery of the fact that the
exchanges of the energy and of the linear momentum between light and matter
are quantized gave a temptation to represent again the light as a stream of
indivisible photons moving rectilinearly and being deflected only on the material
obstacles or absorbed and emitted by the atoms. This picture together with an
assumption that each indivisible photon may pass only by one slit or another
and that the interaction with a slit through which it is passing does not depend
on a fact that the other slit is open or closed is clearly inconsistent with the
observed interference pattern. Anyway photons are not localizable objects but
the same argument could be repeated for a double slit electron experiment.
Therefore we discover that the light and the matter may present wave and
corpuscular behavior in the mutually exclusive ( complementary ) experimental
arrangements.
Moreover there is the wholeness in the experiment : a source is prepared
and calibrated, it interacts with the experimental arrangement and the modi-
fied source and/or the final numerical results the measurements are found. The
only picture given is a black box picture. As an input we have an initial ”beam”
entering a box as an output we have a modified ”beam” ( ”beams”) or a set of
counts of various detectors. Quantum mechanics (QM) does not give any intu-
itive spatio-temporal picture of what is physically happening in the box. The
QM gives only the predictions about the final ”beams” and about statistical
distribution of the counts of the detectors. Let cite Bohr[1] :.. ”Strictly speak-
ing , the mathematical formalism of quantum mechanics and electrodynamics
merely offers rules of calculation for the deduction of expectations pertaining
to observations obtained under well-defined experimental conditions specified
by classical physical concepts”. This statement is valid not only for the descrip-
tion of standard atomic phenomena but also for the S- matrix description of all
scattering processes of elementary particles and for the stochastic models de-
scribing the time evolution of trapped molecules, atoms or ions. The quantum
mechanics and new stochastic approaches have no deterministic prediction for a
single measurement or for a single time -series of events observed for a trapped
ultracold atom. The predictions being of statistical or of stochastic character
apply to the statistical distribution of the results obtained in long runs or in
several repetitions of the experiment. We will give a careful epistemological
discussion of the experiments with trapped atoms, quantum dots and qubits in
the subsequent paper. In this paper we will limit our discussion to standard
experiments and to standard QM.
For example in a two slit interference experiment with low intensity source
of monochromatic light we can ”measure” its intensity by the counts registered
by a photon detector , we can control the intensity of the source by opening and
closing regularly a collimator in order to send regular pulses of light. In this
case we estimate an average intensity of the ”beam” (number of clicks of the
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detector interpreted as a number of photons absorbed) . If our screen behind
the slits is in the form of a panel of photon detectors, after waiting long enough,
we find spatial statistical distribution of the counts registered by detectors con-
sistent with the classical interference pattern. However we are not allowed to
imagine a light as a beam of somewhat localized and separated photons moving
rectilinearly hitting one after another a double slit screen, passing by only one
of the slits and after continuing their way to the detectors.
Similarly if we return to a passage of the boat on a lake we can detect and
even measure the energy and the momentum transferred by the regular waves
hitting a buoy close to the shore. We could even tell that we observe a beam
of ”wavelons” hitting the shore. There would be no comparable transfer of
the energy and momentum on any buoy on a deep water away from a shore.
Therefore we could not make an image of the boat producing a beam of wavelons
which after rectilinear propagation hit the shore. Of course we can see changes
on the surface of the considerable portion of a lake but in quantum physics we
do not see the” lake”.
This example shows a danger of image making. Wrong images lead to con-
tradictions and to wrong deductions. A classical mechanics also concentrates on
the description of the observations without creating too many images. The Sun
and the Earth are represented mathematically by material points characterized
at each moment of time by their masses, positions and velocities. If in some
inertial frame the initial positions and velocities are known Newton’s equations
allow us to determine a subsequent motion of these points which agrees remark-
ably well with a real motion of Earth around the Sun. There is no speculation
by what mechanism a change in the position of one body causes an instanta-
neous change in the acceleration of its far away partner but it does not harm
a success of the model. Of course a quest for more detailed understanding of
the mutual interactions between far apart bodies led to the progress in physics
namely to the development of classical electrodynamics and to the creation of
general theory of relativity.
In spite of the fact that the QM gives only statistical predictions on the
outcomes of the various experiments a claim is made that QM gives a complete
description of the physical phenomena and even the most complete description of
the individual system. Einstein has never accepted this claim and in his famous
paper written with Rosen and Podolsky[2] about EPR paradox he started a
fruitful discussion on the completeness of QM and on general epistemological
foundations of physics. This discussion continues till now.
Many physicists adopt the statistical interpretation of QM[3] in which a
wave function describes only an ensemble of identically prepared physical sys-
tems and the wave function reduction is a passage from the description of the
whole ensemble of these systems to the description of a sub-ensemble satisfying
some additional conditions. The statistical interpretation is free of paradoxes
because a single measurement does not produce the instantaneous reduction of
the wave function. The statistical interpretation leaves a place for the intro-
duction of the supplementary parameters (called often hidden variables) which
would determine the behavior of each particular physical system during the ex-
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periment. Several theories with supplementary parameters (TSP) have been
discussed [4] .
The QM gives predictions for spin polarization correlation experiments(SPCE)
dealing with pairs of electrons or photons produced in a singlet state. In order
to explain these long range correlations Bell[5] analyzed a large family of TSP so
called local or realistic hidden variable theories (LRHV) and showed that their
predictions must violate, for some configurations of the experimental set-up, the
quantum mechanical predictions. Bell’s argument was put into experimentally
verifiable form by Clauser, Horne,Shimony and Holt[6]. Several experiments
in particular those by Aspect et al. [7] confirmed the predictions of quantum
mechanics. Many physicists concluded that if a TSP wants to explain the ex-
perimental data it must allow for the faster than light communication between
particles and violate Einstein’s separability. Even without deep reasoning one
can see that this conclusion must be flawed. Let us imagine a huge volcanic
eruption taking place somewhere in the middle of the Pacific Ocean, the sunami
waves hitting the shores of Japan and America will be correlated in a natural
way. Long range correlations come from the memory of the past events and
time evolution and they have nothing to with extra luminal communications
between far away objects.
It was shown by many authors that the assumptions made in LRHV are
more restrictive that they seem to be and the Bell’s inequalities may be violated
not only by quantum experiments but also by macroscopic ones. Let us men-
tion few of them. Accardi gave an extensive discussion of non-Kolmogorovian
character of the quantum probabilities[8] and noticed that the most important
assumption needed to prove the Bell inequalities is not a locality assumption
but the use of the same probability space. Pitovsky constructed local hidden
variable model [9] which could reproduce the quantum mechanical polarization
predictions. Aerts[10] showed that non-Kolmogorovian character of the quan-
tum probabilities is due to the indeterminacy on the measurements in contrast
to the indeterrminacy on the classical states De Baere[11] strongly claimed that
the violation of Bell inequalities is due to non-reproducibility of a set of hidden
variables in the subsequent experiments.
In 1976 we noticed that if one associates to each EPR pair a couple of bi-
valued spin functions S1(a) and S2(b) where a and b are the unit direction
vectors of polarizers it is not clear how we can use the integration over the finite
dimensional space of hidden variables to describe all these random experiments.
Besides we noticed that we can not prove rigorously the Bell inequalities for
the empirical spin expectation functions because in the runs of the different
experiments the sets of couples of spin functions may be different. Nevertheless
it seemed plausible to us that after averaging the approximate Bell’s inequalities
would still be valid. We communicated our comments to Bell during our short
stay in Geneva in September 1976 but we did not publish them.
In 1982 Bell brought to our attention the Pitovsky’s paper. The model
was using axiom of choice and was quite difficult to understand but it was
able to reproduce QM predictions for the SPCE. We noticed that the model
can be simplified and that by using the particle beams described by Pitovsky’s
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particular spin functions one could reproduce quantum mechanical predictions
and avoid Bell’s inequalities [12, 13]. We noticed also[14] that in all proofs of
Bell’s theorem [15] one is using (directly or indirectly) the assumption that in
the moment of production both members of each pair of quanta have unknown
but well defined and strictly correlated spin projection values in all directions,
distributed according to some joint and unknown probability distribution, and if
we try to measure a spin projection in a particular direction a measuring device
can register a correct value or fail to register it with a small probability. Only in
this case one can obtain predictions for all different random experiments (A,B)
where A denotes polarizer used for a particle 1 and B a polarizer used for a
particle 2 by conditionalization from a single sample (probability) space (at the
time being we did not know the Accardi paper[8]).
However the photons and the electrons are not small spinning balls and it is
well known that the QM is a contextual theory. Namely a value of a physical ob-
servable, here a spin projection, associated with a pure quantum ensemble and
in this way with an individual physical system , is not an attribute of the system
revealed by a measuring apparatus; it turns out to be a characteristic of this
ensemble created by its interaction with the measuring device . It is therefore
meaningless to consider joint spin projection distributions in all directions and
the quantum mechanical predictions can not be hoped to be reproduced from
the TSP models of this type. In the modified Pitovsky model[13] a quantum has
a spin up in A direction if it is a member of an ensemble of particles transmitted
by a polarizer A. The spin functions , in the model, describing interactions of
the quanta with the polarizers, have well defined values on all unit vectors on
a sphere but a passage through a given polarizer depends on the probability
distribution of the unit vectors representing this polarizer , distributed statis-
tically around a macroscopic orientation vector A. For this reason there is no
deterministic prediction on the behavior of two members of each EPR. pair and
strict anti-correlations may not be anticipated before being observed. Similar
conclusions were formulated by Schroeck[16] who analyzed the EPR experiment
using the measurement scheme of stochastic quantum mechanics[17].
In[14] we recalled the paradox of Bertrand [18]who clearly demonstrated the
importance of a direct link of the probabilistic model with a random experiment
which it wants to describe. We underlined that the different experiments are de-
scribed by the probability density distributions defined on their own probability
spaces and they can be described by conditionalization from a single probability
space only if all of then can be performed simultaneously on each member of a
statistical population.
In view of these observations we had no doubt that the violation of Bell
inequalities did not mean that if a TSP wanted to explain the EPR or other
quantum mechanical experiments it had to violate Einstein’s causality. Because
we were quite satisfied with the statistical description of the phenomena and we
were not interested in inventing a new TSP we stopped working on the subject.
With the advent of quantum cryptography introduced by Bennet and Bras-
sard [19, 20] streams of photons were proposed to be used to transmit a secret
key and the fact that any measurement affects the quantum state could be used
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to detect eavesdropping. We find questionable the use of single photons but
certainly a scheme is realizable by using the pulses of the light polarized in
a particular fashion. There is a bigger problem with a model by Ekert [21] in
which strictly correlated EPR pairs are used in order to transmit the same secret
key to Alice and Bob and the Bell’s theorem is used as a test for eavesdropping.
According to us there is no strict anti-correlation on the individual level so the
argument does not hold.
In 2001 we received a preprint of Accardi and Regoli[22] in which they pre-
sented the results of the computer experiment violating Bell’s inequalities and
gave many other arguments and references showing that there was no contra-
diction between quantum theory and locality. According to Accardi a violation
of the Bell’s theorem is due to the concept of chameleon effect [23]( the dynami-
cal evolution of the system depends on the observable one is going to measure)
which is closely related to the fact that the QM is a contextual theory. Accardi’s
biological comparison is nice. In fact a quantum particle has no attributes by
itself. A quantum particle shows different behavior in the interactions with dif-
ferent experimental arrangements similarly to a chameleon whose color depends
whether he is sitting on a leaf or on a trunk of a tree.
The tests of Bell’s theorem led to many beautiful experiments[24] . However
it seems that the epistemological implications of the demonstrated violation of
Bell’s inequalities are still not fully understood by the majority of the physicists
[25].
Moreover we realized that our contributions, still valid, to the subject seem
to be unknown , forgotten or not understood. In particular we introduced direct
tests of the completeness of QM[12, 26)] by means of the purity tests which have
been completely neglected.
This is why we decided in this paper to refine our old reasoning [12, 13, 14, 26]
and to add some new much simpler arguments.
1.2 2.Completeness of a statistical theory.
A statistical description is not a description of the objects but it is a description
of the regularities observed in large populations or in a series of repeated random
experiments performed with the objects. Let see it on examples.
We consider a series of coin flipping experiments. Instead of coins having
head and tails we have coins with one side ”blue”(B) and one side ”red”(R).
If we want to provide a complete description of a coin using the concepts of
classical physics and mechanics we may say that a coin is a round disk of a
given diameter etc.. We can find also its mass, volume, moment of inertia etc.
All these attributes (values of classical observables) describe ”completely” a coin
from a classical point of view. We have also at our disposal various coin- flipping
devices:D1, D2,.. All of them look from outside in the same way: you have a
place to put a coin, one of the faces up, and a button to push on. A coin is
projected and you see it flying , rotating and finally it falls on the observation
plate.
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EXPERIMENT 1 (E1). We start with a device D1 and we use only one
coin. At first we do not pay attention what is a color of a face of the coin which
we put up. For example we record a series of outcomes:BBRBRRRB... At the
first sight it is a time series of events without any regularity. We decide now
to be more systematic and to put always a face B up into the device. To our
big satisfaction we obtain a simple time series: :RRRRRR... If instead we put
a face R up into device we obtain: BBBBB.... From an empirical point of
view our description of the phenomenon is complete. A device D1 is a classical
deterministic device such that if we insert into it a particular coin it changes a
face B up of the coin into a face R up of the coin and vice versa.
However we do not see only the final result we see also the coin flying,revolving
and landing. If you are a physicist you would like to understand why so com-
plicated phenomenon gives a simple deterministic result. Let us imagine that
we are allowed to see the interior of the device. If we see that D1 gives always
to the coin the same initial linear velocity and the same initial angular veloc-
ity then knowing the laws of classical mechanics and taking into consideration
air resistance but neglecting the influence of the air turbulences, caused by the
revolving coin, we can,with a help of a computer , reproduce a flight of the
coin and deduce that the coin placed with one face up will land always on the
observation plate with another face up. It would provide a complete descrip-
tion of the phenomenon. Even if we were unable to make calculations we could
anticipate a result and we could say that we understood ”completely” a phe-
nomenon. Of course we took the Newton’s equations for granted but in some
point looking for the explanation we have to stop asking a question: ”Why?”.
EXPERIMENT 2 (E2). We take the same coin and a device D2. On a basis
of the previous experiment we start by placing the coin always with face B up
and we preform several series of trials. To our surprise we get a time series of
results BRBRBRB...or RBRBR...We obtain similar results if we place the face
R up. A complete empirical explanation of the phenomenon is that D2 produces
completely deterministic alternating series of outcomes. The only uncertainty is
a first result. It shows that a device has some memory. For example a flipping
mechanism of the D2 can be identical to the flipping mechanism of the D1 with
one difference that the inserted coins are rotated around a horizontal axis before
being flipped with a rotating mechanism keeping a memory of events : each 180◦
rotation is followed by 360◦ and vice versa. To understand ”completely” the
phenomenon we look in the interior of the device and we repeat the analysis we
did for D1.
EXPERIMENT 3 (E3) We replace the device D2 by a device D3. We repeat
several times the experiment with the face B up and after with the face R
up. We obtain various time series which seem to be completely random. We
call a colleague statistician for help. He checks that the observed time series
is random. He observes that relative empirical frequencies of observing the
face B in long runs are close to 0.5. It concludes that each experiment is a
Bernoulli trial with a probability p=0.5. Using this assumption he can make
predictions concerning the number of faces B observed in N-repetitions of the
experiment and compare them with the data. A statistical description of the
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observed time-series of results is complete and it may be resumed in the following
rigorous way: Anytime we place the coin into the device D3 there are two
outcomes possible each obtained with a probability 0.5. A probability 0.5 it is
not the information about the coin. It is not the information about the device
D3. It is only the information about the statistical distribution of outcomes of
random experiments : inserting the coin into the device, pushing the button on
and observing the result. This is why a statement: the coin, if flipped, has a
probability 0.5 to land with the face B up is incorrect. All devices considered
above are flipping devices but the statistical distribution of the results they
produce are different. We could correct this statement by adding: if flipped
with the device D3 , but one has to remember what does it mean. Once again
to understand completely the phenomenon we could look in the interior of the
device D3 .For example we might find that D3 is identical to the device D1
but before flipping there was some mechanism rotating the coin in a random
(pseudo random) way. It would allow us to understand more ”completely” the
phenomenon but it would not give us any additional information about the
statistical distribution of results.
There could be however an advantage of this ”complete” description of the
phenomena. Let us imagine that to each device considered above we add a ven-
tilator blowing on the coin when it is flying. It would certainly modify statistical
distribution of results in the experiments E1 and E2. From the empirical point
of view the device D1 with a ventilator it is a new device D’1 so we have a new
random experiment and a new statistical distribution to be found. However on
this level we are unable to predict how this new description originates from a
previous one. On the contrary a knowledge of the ”complete ” description of
the phenomenon describing a flight of the coin produced by D1 could be used
to predict the modifications induced by the wind produced by the ventilator.
If we had a classical theory describing time evolution of the air turbulences
and its interactions with the coin ( which we don’t have) we could in principle
determine the possible trajectories of the coin and deduce the changes in the
statistical distribution of experimental results.
In all these experiments we saw the coin flying and we could look inside the
experimental devices. If we did not have this knowledge but only the knowledge
of final results the only unambiguous description would be a statistical one.
Probably we could invent infinite number of ” microscopic” hidden variable
models agreeing with observation but we would not gain any better under-
standing of the results. This resembles to the situation in quantum mechanics.
We have a stable source producing some beam. We place some detector in
front of the beam which clicks regularly what makes us believe that we have a
beam of some invisible ”particles” having some constant intensity. We take
the detector out and we pass our beam by the experimental arrangement ( a
device) and we observe a time– series of the possible final outcomes. QM gives
us the algorithms to calculate the time independent probability distributions of
the outcomes giving no information how the time -series is building up. Ein-
stein understood very well the statistical description of the experiments given
by QM but he believed that this statistical description should be ”completed
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” by some”microscopic” description explaining how the observed time- series
of the results is building up. It seems to us that if such description existed, it
would be extremely complicated and not unique so perhaps not very useful.
Even if one does not think that such ”microscopic ” description is needed
a hypothesis, that such description is possible, suggests that there is some in-
formation in the time- series of the results not accounted for by the statistical
description given by QM. If it was true a careful analysis of time- series of re-
sults could reveal some structure not explained by QM what would imply that
statistical description provides the incomplete statistical description of the data.
Therefore a question whether a particular statistical description of the phe-
nomenon is complete or not, it is an experimental question which can be asked
and answered independently of the existence of a ”microscopic” description of
the phenomenon. The answer can be obtained with the help of the purity tests
which were proposed many years ago[12, 26] and which we will discuss in some
detail in the moment. Let us continue a discussion of simple macroscopic ex-
periments which hopefully will help to understand our point of view.
As we saw in the experiment E1 any time- series obtained could be inter-
preted as a series of the results of the consecutive repetitions of the identical
Bernoulli trials each characterized completely by a probability p = 0.5. Let us
consider now another random experiment.
EXPERIMENT 4 (E4) .There is a box containing the coins but we do not
see what is in the box. There are 51 blue coins and 51 red coins in the box
.With closed eyes we mix well the coins , we draw one coin from the box, we
place it on a table and finally we open the eyes and we record the color of the
coin. We decide to repeat this experiment n-times up to n=100 and after 100
repetitions we return all coins drawn into the box without looking at them.. If
we use the various runs(samples) with n bigger for example than 95 to estimate
the frequency of observing a blue face we will find that it is close to 0.5 so we
are ready to conclude that a probability of drawing a blue face in each draw is
equal to 0.5 and mathematically speaking the experiment E4 is the same as the
experiment E3. Our friend statistician tells us not to jump into conclusion too
fast because if initially in the box we have 2N coins ( N red and N blue) on the
average we find 50% of blue coins in a sample but a time- series is different and
in principle we can discover it by more detailed statistical analysis of this series.
In the case of the Bernoulli trials at each repetition the probability of obtaining
B is the same. On the contrary the probability of drawing a blue coin in the
k-th draw depends on a number of blue coins drawn already. Namely if among
the k draws there were m blue coins in this case the probability of obtaining a
blue coin in the next draw is p(k+1)=p(k+1,m,
N)= (N-m)/(2N-k). Consequently we will have a hypergeometric distribution
instead of binomial etc.
Thus in the E4 we have a succession of the different dependent random
experiments when in the E3 we have a succession of the identical independent
random experiments. The averages of two time series are consistent but they
have completely different structure. In this case a statement that a probability
of drawing a blue face is in each draw equal to 0.5 is not only incomplete but it is
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also incorrect. If we modify the experiment E4 namely by returning the coin to
the box after each draw our new experiment is, for samples of a size smaller than
102, completely equivalent to the experiment E3. On the ”microscopic ” level
there is however one fundamental difference: in the E4 the coins in the box are
always either blue or red when the coin in the experiment E3 is neither blue nor
red but unfortunately this difference is not seen from the existing data. To see
more easily how such ”microscopic” differences could be detected by performing
additional experiments we will discuss another macroscopic experiments with
the coins.
EXPERIMENT 5 (E5) There is a box ,which contains now 50 blue coins
and 50 red coins having all other physical properties identical. A button is
pushed and a mechanical arm picks at random one of the coins in a box and
inserts it into the device D3. The result B or R is recorded and handed to the
experimenter and a coin is returned to the box.
EXPERIMENT 6 (E6) The only difference with E5 is that instead of con-
taining 50 red and 50 blue coins a box contains 100 two-sided coins identical
to the coin used in the experiments E1-E3. All other physical properties of
two-sided coins are the same as the physical properties of the coins in the E5.
These two experiments produce random time-series of results which do not
allow to find any significant difference between them. Two physicists agree
with this statement but they cannot agree how to interpret the results. One of
them ,a pupil of Einstein, says : we have a statistical mixture(mixed statistical
ensemble) in the box of the same number of blue and red coins and because we
draw the coins from the box with replacement thus on average we observe 50%
of blue coins in each run of the experiment. A second , pupil of Bohr , says: it is
a nonsense we have simply a pure statistical ensembles of quantum coins each in
the same pure quantum state, such that each of them has simply a probability
0.5 to become blue or red after interacting with the measuring device.
They meet a statistician who confirms that the experiments give the in-
distinguishable results and tells them that without performing supplementary
experiments one cannot decide whose model is a correct one. He tells them
that in a mixed statistical ensemble every of it sub-ensembles can in principle
have different observable statistical properties. On the contrary if one has a
pure statistical ensemble all of its sub-ensembles have the same properties as
the initial ensemble.
Our physicists agree with the statistician and they make a hole in the boxes
containing coins and they decide to remove the same number of coins in the E5
and in the E6 before proceeding with several repetitions of their experiment.
If they removed by chance the equal number of blue and red coins in the E5
no difference could be noticed but if they by chance changed a proportion of blue
coins in their box they could see the difference in long runs of the experiment.
If less coins were left in the box the differences could be bigger. For example
with 4 blue and 6 red coins in the box the probability of B became 0.4 instead
of 0.5. With one blue coin in a box they would get p=1.
Following the same protocol for the experiment E6 they did not register any
significant difference in the results. They concluded that there is a ”microscopic”
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difference between the E5 and the E6 and that Einstein’s model apply to the
E5 and Bohr’s model apply to E6.
Therefore a claim that the QM gives a complete description of the individual
quantum system may not be disproved by any philosophical argument nor by a
mathematical theorem it may only be disproved by the experimental data. The
only situation when the statistical predictions on the results of the experiments
performed on the ensemble of identically prepared individual systems can be
said to describe completely the interaction of the individual system with the
experimental device occurs when the observed time-series is random and the
statistical ensemble is pure.
The assumption of the completeness of the statistical description provided by
QM is not only unnecessary but it is counter- productive. The experimentalists
are interested only in testing the statistical distributions of the experimental
results in long runs without even trying to analyze the observed time-series.
They eliminate the ”bad” experimental runs, sometimes without finding any
logical reason for doing it, simply because in the theory there is no place for
them. We have enormous amount of data accumulated. If we performed the
tests of the randomness and the purity tests[26] on these data perhaps we would
discover new statistical regularities in the time- series we had never thought of.
Let us talk now about the origin of the purity tests.
1.3 3.Purity tests
The QM did recognize that the purity of the quantum ensemble is important if
a claim was made that QM provides the complete description of the individual
system. However to define the purity the QM concentrated on the preparation
stage of the experiment. Namely a system was said to be in a pure quantum state
if it passed by a maximal filter or if a complete set of commuting observables
was measured on the system.
A purity of the statistical ensemble describing the interactions of such pre-
pared state with some other experimental device was not considered. Moreover
it was not clear how we could know that a filter is maximal and how do we con-
struct it. Besides in the axiomatic quantum mechanics, initiated by a paper by
Birkhoff and von Neumann[27], it was claimed that to each vector in the Hilbert
space corresponds a realizable physical state of a physical system and that the
Hilbert space description is general enough to describe all imaginable future
phenomena. The last claim was nicely refuted by Mielnik[21] who showed that
one can imagine infinitely many non-Hilbertian ”quantum” worlds. Inspired by
first two Mielnik’s papers we decided to analyze various general experimental
set-ups which could be used to investigate the phenomena characterizing the
ensembles of particle-beams. We considered the sources of some hypothetical
particle beams, detectors( counters), filters,transmitters and instruments This
analysis[29] led us to the various conclusions. Let us list those which are perti-
nent to the topic of this paper:
1) Properties of the beams depend on the properties of the devices and
vice-versa and are defined only in terms of the observed interactions between
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them. For example a beam b is characterized by the statistical distribution of
outcomes obtained by passing by all the devices di. A device d is defined by
the statistical distributions of the results it produces for all available beams bi.
All observables are contextual and physical phenomena observed depend on the
richness of the beams and of the devices.
2) In different runs of the experiments we observe the beams bk each char-
acterized by its empirical probability distribution. Only if an ensemble ß of
all these beams is a pure ensemble of pure beams we can associate the esti-
mated probability distributions of the results with the beams b∈ß and with the
individual particles members of these beams.
3) A general operational definition of a pure ensemble ß :
A pure ensemble ß of pure beams b is characterized by such probability
distribution s(r) which remains approximately unchanged:
(i) for the new ensembles ßi obtained from the ensemble ß by the application
of the i-th intensity reduction procedure on each beam b∈ß
(ii) for all rich sub-ensembles of ß chosen in a random way
In 1974 we noticed[30, 33, 36] that if the initial two-particle states in strong-
interaction physics were mixed with respect to some additional parameter,for ex-
ample the impact parameter, and if we wrote the unitary S-matrix as S=I⊕S1instead
of S=iT+I then the probability would be conserved but the optical theorem
could not be proven. Because all extrapolations to the forward direction were
unreliable[35, 36] therefore the only way to check our hypothesis was to find
this particular impurity of initial states in high energy scattering. . For this
purpose we proposed various purity tests[31, 32, 34]. The experiments to test
our hypothesis were never done. In 1984 we noticed [26] that the similar purity
tests could be used to test the completeness of the quantum mechanics.
The idea is extremely simple and it was explained in the previous section:
one has to study in detail time-series of the experimental results and look for
some fine structure.
Besides one has to compare different runs of the same experiment looking
for statistically significant discrepancies. Namely if bi is a beam of mi particles
produced by a stable source O in the time interval [ti, ti +∆t] we obtain a
sample Si by measuring an observable γX on the beam bi. We may also obtain
the families of the beams bi(j), where j denotes j-th beam intensity reduction
procedure applied to the beam bi. Measuring γX on the beams bi(j) we obtain
new samples Si(j).
To test the purity of the beams produced by O we test a hypothesis
H0: All the samples Siand Si(j) are drawn from the same unknown statistical
population of the random variable X associated to the observable γX.
An extensive use of the non-parametric statistical tests is needed[34]. We
are in 2002 nobody did the purity tests. Unfortunately all the experiments
confirming the validity of the quantum mechanical statistical predictions and
the violation of Bell’s theorem eliminates LHRV but are unable to prove the
completeness of QM. Let us see this in more detail
.
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1.4 4.Bell’s Theorem
To each random experiment we associate a random variable X, a probability
space S and a probability density function fX(x) for all x∈ S.
If X is a discrete random variable
∑
x
fX(x)=1 and P(X=x)=fX(x) If X is a
continuous random variable
∫
S
fX(x)dx=1 and
P(a≤X≤b) =
∫
a
b fX(x)dx (1)
where P(a≤X≤b) is a probability of finding a value of X included between
a and b. Note that P(X=x) = 0 for all x∈S.
If in a random experiment we can measure simultaneously values of k- ran-
dom variables X1,...Xk we describe the experiment by a k-dimensional random
variable X= (X1,..,Xk), a common probability space S and some joint prob-
ability density function fX1X2..Xk (x1,..xk) . From the joint probability density
function one can obtain various conditional probabilities and by integration over
k-1 variables one obtains k marginal probability density functions fXi(xi) de-
scribing k different random experiments each performed to measure only one
random variable Xi and neglecting all the others . In this case we say that fXi
(xi ) were obtained by conditionalization from a unique probability space S. In
general if the random variables Xi are dependent (correlated)
fX1X2..Xk (x1,..xk)6=fX1(x1) fX2(x2)...fXk (xk) (2)
Each spin polarization correlation experiment (A,B) is defined by two macro-
scopic orientation vectorsA and B being some average orientation vectors of the
realistic polarizer. A polarizer A is defined by a probability distribution dρA(a) ,
where a are the microscopic direction vectors, a∈ OA =
{
a ∈ S(2); |1− a ·A| ≤ εA
}
.
Similarly a polarizer B is defined by dρ(b). The probability p(A,B) that a par-
ticle 1 passes through the polarizer A and a particle 2 , correlated with the
particle 1 passes through a polarizer B is given by
p(A,B)=
∫
OA
∫
OB
p12(a, b)dρA(a)dρ(b) (3)
where p12(a, b) is a probability density function given by QM :p12(a, b)=
1
2 sin
2(θab/2).In the reference [13] we used a slightly different but consistent
notation. It is impossible to perform different experiments(A,B) simultaneously
on the same couple of the particles therefore it does not seem possible to use a
unique probability space S and to obtain,by conditionalization, the probabilities
p(A,B) for all such experiments.
Let us for example analyze a model used by Clauser and Horne [37]to prove
their inequalities:
p(A,B)=
∫
Λ
p1(λ,A) p2(λ,B)dρ(λ) (4)
where p1(λ,A) and p2(λ,B) are the probabilities of detecting component 1
and component 2 respectively , given the state λ of the composite system .
We see from (4) that a state λ is determined by all the values of strictly
correlated spin projections of two components for all possible orientations of
the polarizers A and B. The polarizers are not perfect therefore the detection
probabilities have been introduced. Therefore it is assumed in the model that
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even before the detection each component has well defined spin projection in all
directions. Therefore a model is using a single probability space Λ and obtains
the predictions on the probabilities p(A,B) measured in different experiments
by conditionalization. As we told the same assumption was used in all other
proofs of Bell’s theorem. Explicit description of states λ by the values of spin
projections is also clearly seen in Wigner’s proof[38].
As we told the experiments (A,B) are mutually exclusive there is no justifi-
cation for using such models.
If we try to prove the Bell’s inequalities by comparing only the experimental
runs of different experiments we can not do it without some additional and
questionable assumptions.
Let us simplify the argument we gave in[14] .We want to estimate a value
of the spin expectation function EAB for an experiment (A,B) . We have to
perform several runs of the length N and find the value of the empirical spin
expectation function rN (A,B) for each run and after to find EAB by averaging
over various runs. Let us associate with each member of a pair a spin function
s1(x) or s2(x), taking the values 1 or -1, on the unit sphere S
(2) (representing the
orientation vectors of various polarizers) .We assume also that s1(x) =- s2(x)=
s(x) for all vectors x∈S(2). We saw in (3) that the macroscopic directions A
and B were not sharp therefore in each particular run we might have different
direction vectors (a,b) representing them.. If for the simplicity we neglect this
possibility, we get:
rN (A,B)= −
1
N
∑
i
si(A)si(B) (5)
where N functions si are drawn from some uncountable set of spin functions
F0.
If we consider a particular run of the same length from the experiment (A,C)
we get
rN (A,C)= −
1
N
∑
j
sj(A)sj(C) (6)
where N functions sj are drawn from the same uncountable set of spin
functions F0.
A probability that we have the same sets of spin functions in both experi-
mental runs is equal to zero. Therefore in general we have completely distinct
sets of functions in (5) and (6). and we are unable to prove the Bell’s theorem
make by using rN(A,B)-rN (A,C). If we used the same sets of spin functions in
the runs from the different experiments then we could replace (6) by (7)
rN (A,C)=−
1
N
∑
i
si(A)si(C) (7)
and we could easily reproduce the Bell’s proof finding the similar inequal-
ities. However the formula is counter-factual and does not represent the exper-
imental data.
Let us notice the act of passage of the i-th particle through a given polarizer A
depends in a complicated way on its interaction with this polarizer. Therefore we
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should not consider a spin function as describing a state of a particle independent
of its interaction with A.. The spin functions si n the (5) and (6) resume
the interactions of the subsequent particles with the polarizers in a particular
experiment. Therefore if we want to be rigorous we should replace (5) by (8).
rN (A,B)= −
1
N
∑
i
si,A(ai)si,B(bi) (8)
where ai ∈ OA and bi ∈ OB. If we use the formula (8) there is no possibility
of proving Bell’s theorem . This formula is consistent with the probabilistic
model (3) and with the contextual character of observables.
A particular trivial, but artificial, example when a common probability space
S could have been used is a case when we have 4 independent random variables
X1,X’1,X2,X’2 each described by its probability density function. If all these
variables have only the values ±1 a proof of Bell’s inequalities is extremely easy
. The ”spin” expectation function EX1X2 is a product of expectation values of
X1 and X2 : EX1X2 = 〈X1〉 〈X2〉 and we immediately get
|〈X1〉 〈X2〉 − 〈X1〉 〈X
′
2〉|+ |〈X
′
1〉 〈X2〉+ 〈X
′
1〉 〈X
′
2〉| ≤ |〈X
′
1〉 − 〈X
′
2〉|+|〈X
′
1〉+ 〈X
′
2〉| ≤
2 (9)
Of course if we assume the independence there are no correlations. The
statistical independence is equivalent to separability of the statistical opera-
tor used recently by Kru¨ger in his proofs of Bell’s inequalities in [39] and in
unpublished paper presented at TH 2002.
We find all these arguments very convincing but it is well known that a
single picture is better than thousand words. This picture was given by the
computer pseudo-random experiments of Accardi et al.[22] which violate Bell’s
inequalities giving an example of the family of random experiments which cannot
be described using a unique probability space S.
Therefore the violation of Bell’s inequalities found in SPCE proves that
the probabilistic model used by LRHV is inappropriate but it tells nothing
about completeness of QM or about the impossibility of causal ”microscopic”
explanation of quantum experiments.
Let us examine the ”microscopic”description of the classical experiment E3
which we discussed in one of the preceding sections. We see that this descrip-
tion does not depend on observed results B or R, it depends on other physical
properties of the coin , on the mechanical properties of the device and even
on the properties of the ambient air. All these ”hidden” parameters explain
in very complicated way the observed events. Similarly a pilot wave models of
de Broglie[40], Bohm[41] and Vigier[42] reproduce in a complicated way some
of the quantum mechanical predictions. We like a remark by Tartalia [43] that
objects in the quantum world are like programmed machines capable of different
behaviors according to the physical conditions locally triggering them.
Another important implication of (3) and (8) is that the observable value
of the spin projection characterizes only the whole beam of the particles which
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passed through a given polarizer A. Nearly 100% of the particles of this beam
pass through a subsequent polarizer A, but we have no prediction concerning
any individual particle from the beam. Therefore in SPCE p(A,A’) 6= 1 and
we have no strict spin anti-correlations between the members of each pair[13].
1.5 5.Bertrand’s paradox.
Many probabilists in 19th century believed that for each random experiment
there exists a probability distribution which may be determined only by com-
binatorial or geometric considerations .In 1889 Bertrand showed[18] that the
various equally good mathematical arguments, in case of the continuous ran-
dom variables, may lead to completely different predictions on the probabilities.
He considered two concentric circles on a plane with radii R and R/2, respec-
tively. He showed that there are different possible answers to a question: ”
What is the probability P that a chord of the bigger circle chosen at random
cuts the smaller one at least in one point?. The various answers are[14]: if we
divide the ensemble of all chords into sub-ensembles of parallel chords, we find
P= 1/2. If we consider the sub-ensembles having the same beginning , we find
P=1/3 . Finally if we look for the midpoints of the chords lying in the small
circle , we find P=1/4 . A solution of the paradox is simple: the different values
of P correspond to the different random experiments which may performed in
order to find the experimental answer to the Bertrand’s question. Thus the
probabilities have only a precise meaning if the random experiments used for
their estimation are specified.
Let us suppose now that we have a straight stick of the length 2R. We
draw two concentric circles on the horizontal platform and we construct three
machines M1, M2 and M3 working according to appropriate different pseudo-
random protocols corresponding to different reasonings presented above..
In the first experiment we insert a stick into the machine M1 which picks up
a ”point” Q on the large circle, then follows the diameter of the circle arriving
to the point Q1 located in the randomly chosen distance r from the point Q (0
≤ r ≤ 2R). Next M1 places the stick perpendicularly to the diameter joining
Q and Q1 with the midpoint of a stick coinciding with the point Q1. If the
stick touches in at least one point the smaller circle we may say that the value
of the random variable X is equal to 1 otherwise it’s value is -1. After many
repetitions of this experiment we find the probability p(X=1)=1/2.
Similarly in the second experiment we can obtain the probability p(Y=1)=1/3
and in the third p(Z=1)=1/4. It is feasible but unreasonable and artificial to
introduce a unique probability space S and the joint probability distribution of
X,Y and Z in order to deduce, by conditionalization., the probability distribu-
tions of our three random experiments.
1.6 6.Conclusions
The experimental tests of Bell’s theorem can neither confirm the completeness
of QM nor to prove that the only TSP models able to give a ”microscopic”
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description of the SPCE have to violate Einstenian causality.
A question whether a statistical description provided by the quantum the-
ory gives a complete description of the experimental data is fully justified. This
question about completeness can not be answered by proving a mathemati-
cal theorem or by constructing ad hoc TSP model reproducing the quantum
predictions.
This question of the completeness of quantum theory can be only answered
by a detailed analysis of the time- series of the experimental results which can
be done with the help of the purity tests which were proposed many years ago
and never done.
If the deviations from the randomness were detected and some new regular-
ities found , the standard statistical description given by the quantum theory
should be completed by a description using probably the ideas of the stochas-
tic processes. In some sense this change of the description has already been
made in the stochastic approaches used to explain various phenomena involv-
ing trapped atoms, ions and molecules. In these approaches the wave function
obeys a Schro˝dinger equation with an effective Hamiltonian separated by quan-
tum jumps occurring at random times. The purity tests could be also used to
check these new stochastic models which assume without checking the ergodicity
of the observed time-series. The question of the completeness formulated in this
way is independent of the existence or non existence of a detailed ”microscopic”
description of the phenomena presenting this particular stochastic behavior.
From Bertrand’s paradox we learned that we should not talk about the prob-
abilities without referring to the random experiments used to determine them
Therefore the quantum theory providing the predictions for various probabilities
should not loose its contact with the experiments it wants to describe.
If one forgets that the quantum theory does not give any ”microscopic”
images but it provides only the mathematical algorithms able to describe the
statistical regularities observed in the data one is tempted to create incorrect
mental ”microscopic” images which lead to false paradoxes and to speculations
which seem to be a pure science fiction.
The quantum observables are contextual what means that their values are
not the attributes of the individual members of the quantum ensemble but they
give only the information about the possible interactions of the whole ensemble
with the measuring devices. If the ensemble is pure one can speak about the
probabilistic information pertinent to the interaction of each individual system
with the measuring device. To be able to do this one must check the purity of
the ensemble using the purity tests.
There is no strict anti-correlations of two time-series of the results of mea-
surements performed on two members of EPR pair in the SPCE thus these two
time series may not be used in quantum cryptography to assure that Bob and
Alice use the same secret key.
The purity tests are important and relatively simple , the data are available.
We hope that this paper will convince some experimentalists to do them.
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